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"Legal History" or the History of

Law: A Primer on Bringing the
Law's Past into the Present*
Stephen B. Presser**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Ten years ago, legal history was not taken particularly seriously, and there was still much truth in Daniel Boorstin's 1965 lament that "while lawyers, judges, and law professors repeat platitudes about their glorious professional past, they find no
respectable place for legal history in their extensive curricula." 1
With the publication in 1973 of Lawrence Friedman's A History of
American Law,2 however, American law professors could quickly
gain an overview of their own disciplines and bring law school legal
history courses out of thirteenth century England.3 Five years
later, Morton J. Horwitz' book on American legal history4 won the
Bancroft Prize, which is Columbia University's award for outstand* This Article is based on remarks that the author gave on June 1, 1981, as an address
at the American Association of Law Schools' Conference on Teaching Contracts, which was
held at the University of Wisconsin Law School in Madison, Wisconsin.
** Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1971,
Harvard University. My colleagues Timothy Breen and Brook Manville made helpful criticisms of an early draft, for which I thank them.
1. D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 444 (1965).
2. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973).
3. The materials always had been available for the few people who had the substantial
fortitude to assemble them. The pioneers were Mark De Wolfe Howe, J. Willard Hurst,
George Haskins, and Julius Goebel, Jr. See, e.g., C. AUERBACH, L. GARRISON, J. W. HURST &
S. MERMIN, THE LEGAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION TO DECISION-MAKING BY JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1961); J. GOEBEL, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

(1931); G.

HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN

EARLY MASSACHUSEtrs: A STUDY IN TRADITION AND DESIGN (1960); M. HOWE, READINGS IN
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1949).

Friedman synthesized and built upon the work of Hurst and his school. The availability
of Friedman's work made it more likely that American law schools would be able to offer
legal history courses that met Calvin Woodard's prescription for "relevance" by concentrating on nineteenth-century America-a period that law students might find more pertinent
than the traditional focus of late medieval England. See Woodard, History, Legal History,
and Legal Education, 53 VA. L. REV. 89, 113-21 (1967).
4. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977).
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ing historical scholarship and probably the history discipline's
highest professional honor. This selection marked the first time
that a work in Americim legal history had won the award, and it
conferred a new mantle of legitimacy on legal historians in general.
These two books, plus a few significant others, 5 generated dozens
of reviews in legal publications,s and those periodicals began to
publish pieces concerning the history of American law on a far
more regular basis.7 By 1979 two major lawbook publishers apparently had become convinced that a new potential market existed
for American legal history textbooks, 8 and almost all law schools
now offer either a course or a seminar in American legal history.
Two other factors besides the recent effusion of scholarship
have contributed to the growing respectability of American legal
history in the legal curricula. One is the newly perceived, postWatergate need for ethics in the law. Legal history, as it is practiced currently, concerns the discovery, articulation, and evaluation
of the norms that have guided American courts, legislatures, and
lawyers in the past; this information supposedly sharpens one's
judgment about the appropriate values to implement in the future.
Second, many undergraduates contemplating law school now are
pursuing increasingly specialized curricula. Until recently, many
schools simply did not encourage a generalized course of study,
and educational specialization seemed to offer a surer and safer
chance to achieve the high grade point averages now needed for
admission to law school. As a result, some students believe that law
school offers the last chance to obtain a dose of humanistic learning. These students often conclude that although philosophical insights might not readily be gained in most law school courses, the
perspective acquired in courses such as American legal history can
contribute both a missing sense of community of endeavor and an
antidote to the cynical instrumentalism that so often prevails in
law schools.'
5. See, e.g., M. BLoomina, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCmrv 1776-1876
(1976); W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAw (1975); G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN
JUDIcIAL TRADITION (1976).
6. For a collection of many of some reviews, see LAw IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
AN THE RzvoLUTION IN THE LAw: A COLLECTION OF REVIW ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY (H. Hartog ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as LAw I THE AmRCAN REVOLUTmON].
7. See, e.g., ESSAYS IN NINETEmmH CENTURY AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (W. Holt ed.
1976) (collecting many law review articles on legal history).
8. See, e.g., S. PRESSER & J. ZAINALDN, LAW AND AMmuCAN HISToRY. CASES AND
MATERuALS (1980); READINGS ON THE AMEIcAN LEGAL PROFESSION (D. Nolan ed. 1980).
9. Cf. Kronman, Foreword:Legal Scholarship and Moral Education,90 YALE L.J. 955
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The increasing opportunities to teach legal history in law
schools and the lamentable decline of positions available to historians in undergraduate institutions have resulted in more historians
either teaching in law schools or combining graduate training in
history with graduate training in law. As a result, several methodologies or approaches to legal history have emerged. Although legal
history has generated a great deal of comment, 10 few have written
about how this spate of scholarship and criticism might affect law
school teaching. This Article attempts to categorize and to review,
therefore, the kinds of insights that American legal history currently offers both to law students and to law professors. Parts II
and III of the Article sketch the parameters of the legal history
discipline and describe the variant historiographical approaches
that scholars recently have adopted. Part IV then offers some suggestions for integrating legal history into selected law school
courses.

II. THE CORE VALUES OF AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
As a "perspective course," legal history seeks to raise law students to a new level of insight; to permit them, in Holmes' memorable phrase, to hear some of "the echoes of the infinite";" and to
make them appreciate that the nature of what has gone before facilitates and circumscribes what happens in the law today. Because
legal history necessarily deals with longer time periods than do
other law school courses, legal history professors more easily can
discern and elaborate on the nature of the past and the process of
change in the law. Like other law professors, those who teach legal
history seek ultimately to prepare lawyers to condition their legal
actions not only to the immediate needs of their clients, but also to
the continuing needs of the constitutional order. The advantage of
an extra degree of removal from the more immediate doctrinal and
procedural requirements of practice, however, puts legal historians
in a unique position to underscore these duties and obligations of
prospective lawyers.
This broader aspect of American legal history teaching potentially offers the greatest reward for both teacher and student. Since
one can assume that many law students could have pursued alter(1981) (discussing law professors' obligations to use their scholarship and teaching to promote a reverence for truth and to fight cynicism in their students).
10. See, e.g., LAW IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 6.
11. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 478 (1897).
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native graduate business courses that could have provided quicker
and more substantial financial reward than could the practice of
law, one can also assume that law students are after more than
money. At some level, then, although one must probe very deeply
in some stubborn cases, a law professor may draw on a shared
commitment to altruistic enterprise, a shared desire to implement
ideals of justice, and a shared realization that the law-whatever
its current or past limitations-has been a principal instrument in
the physical betterment of mankind's condition. Actually showing
law students that they are engaged in a worthy struggle of this sort
provides an experience that confirms the value of instruction for
both teacher and student and can lead to some of the solutions
modern society so desperately needs in its search for meaning in
human existence.
One can also describe this value of legal history teaching in
Edmund Burke's metaphorical terms by characterizing the job of
law professors in general, and legal historians in particular, as an
attempt to convince students that they must view the law as Burke
viewed the social contract. Burke argued that this contract does
not constitute an agreement which is easily dissolvable by one of
its parties, but is instead an ongoing partnership among members
of society in all science, art, and virtue.12 Since the ends of such a
partnership cannot be obtained without the effort of many generations, Burke suggested, "it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those
who are dead, and those who are to be born.'" Similarly, the law
professor's task is to suggest to students the dangers of pursuing
legal quests for instantaneous transformations, utopian solutions,
or even short-term manipulations that eventually might undermine
the long-term goals of American law. To make all these glittering
generalities meaningful, as well as to set some manageable and intelligible limits on the multi-generational partnership, one necessarily must specify what the goals of American law have been. Fortunately, this task has preoccupied the teaching and scholarship of
most recent legal historians. 4
12. E.

BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 194-95 (O'Brien ed. 1969).
13. Id.
14. Another way to state these ultimate goals of law teaching is to suggest that professors should communicate to students that they are involved in an important international
human dialogue which seeks to determine the appropriate modern jurisprudential principles
for the promotion of justice. This dialogue-or search-attempts to uncover American
equivalents for the civil-law concepts of "Recht" or "Droit," which are used to formulate
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As suggested below, 15 however, no general agreement exists
among legal historians about the prominence of any single, overarching theme in American legal history. Consequently, perhaps
the best approach to the study of legal history is to stress the variety and the richness of the goals of the various legal doctrines as
they have evolved and to emphasize that much of American law
has concerned the reconciliation of conflicting aims and values in
our legal culture."' Since at least the early nineteenth century, several prominent ideals, which properly can be characterized as "core
values," have been evident in American law. Although lawyers and
laymen generally agree that these several ideals are desirable, the
problem of their order of priority has been a source of great conflict, since the ideals, when pushed to their limits, exclude or diminish one another. This part of the Article describes these core
values and then uses them as a means of thematic discrimination
to explain some of the current variant approaches to American le-

gal history.
The most basic core value of American law-1 7 --and, indeed, of
virtually any human society-is the ideal enshrined in the concept
of the "rule of law" itself: any compulsion in the society must not
take place arbitrarily, but must be subject to some restraints.
These restraints might develop from a variety of diverse sources,
including the law of nature, God, the social contract, or clearly announced and procedurally valid acts of the temporal sovereign.
standards for evaluating the specific positive rules of law. See Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal
Thought, 90 YALE L. J. 970, 980-84 (1981).

15. See infra notes 34-96 and accompanying text.
16. The effort to stress competing values is emerging as a useful corrective for both
"legal nominalism"-the notion that no legal rules are inherently better than any
others-and the "efficiency" or "wealth maximization" school of economic analysis of law,
which holds out greater material prosperity as the aim of the law. Fletcher, supra note 14, at
995-96. Fletcher emphasizes two recent efforts to study the variated nature of legal values.
See B. AcKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONsTrruTION (1977) (differing approaches to
compensation for governmental appropriation of private property); Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976) (relative influences
of altruism and idealism in the history of contract law).
17. The four core values that are described below might well be criticized as "cartesianism, the construction of drastically simplified models of social reality," and thus as an
unacceptable reduction of the real complexities of the historical context. See Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1025-28 (1981). Nevertheless, the approach has proved heuristic, and-at least as far as beginning legal history students are
concerned-the process of illuminating the richness of the historical context must start
somewhere. Some cartesianism, therefore, may be necessary to perform a current "criticial
academic task, ... to clarify the competing ideals currently struggling for ascendency...
by placing them in historical. . . context." Ackerman, The Marketplace of Ideas, 90 YALE
L.J. 1131, 1140 (1981).
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This most basic principle represents the idea that the legal system
must provide restraints on arbitrarypower."' Because of the primacy of this core value, it can be discerned earliest in what might
be characterized as the beginning of the American legal culture-the time during our colonial period in which we mirrored the
struggles of the English in their civil wars and their Glorious
Revolution through American events such as the Zenger Trial,1 9
the Writs of Assistance Case,20 and the writing of the Declaration
of Independence.
The second core value of the American legal culture is the
ideal of popularsovereignty. Following its rebirth in Europe," this
notion emerged in America as people began to accept the idea that
the best way to prevent the exercise of arbitrary power is to disperse political power as widely as possible and to lodge ultimate
sovereignty in the citizenry. The second core value was born soon
after the first2 2 and was certainly of paramount importance in the
theoretical framework both of the Declaration of Independence
and of the federal constitution of 1787. This legal ideal, however, is
perhaps the most problematic-if not the most hypocritical-of all
the four values: women and racial and ethnic minorities effectively
have been excluded from the definition of "people" throughout
much of American history, and the people themselves can never
effectively exercise sovereignty because some representative must
exercise it on their behalf. For these reasons, the founding fathers
proclaimed the United States to be a republic and not a democracy. Nevertheless, as American history has unfolded, many people
often have equated the principle of popular sovereignty with the
18. Many of the assertions that are made in this part of the Article are developed in
their historical context in the Teacher's Manual to S. PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, supra note 8.
For one of the most influential statements of freedom as the absence of subjection to arbitrary power, see J. LocKS, THE SECoND TREATisz OF GOVERNMENT ch. IV, 22 (1690).
19. See J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER
ZENGER 1 (1972). Peter Zenger was tried in New York in 1735 for seditious libel, and a jury
acquitted him after an historic argument by his lawyer, Andrew Hamilton. The case
marked an early statement in colonial America that the sovereign was not immune from
criticism. Id. at 34-35.
20. For the primary sources on this case-also known as "Paxton's Case"--in which
American Whigs argued that unlimited search warrants were unconstitutional instruments
of tyranny, see S. PRESSER & J. ZANALDIN, supra note 8, at 61-89.
21. See, e.g., J. LocKz, supra note 18.
22. An example of its operation in colonial America is Andrew Hamilton's rhetoric in
the Zenger trial. See J. ALEXANDER, supra note 19. The controversy over proprietary quitrents in New Jersey in the 1740's provides another example of this second core value. See
Presser, An Introductionto the Legal History of ColonialNew Jersey, 7 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 262
(1976).
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idea of democracy, and they have never made it universally clear
whether our legal system exists to implement the wishes of the
people, or whether it exists merely to effect what the representatives think best benefits the people.
The tensions brought about by the impossibility of the complete implementation of popular sovereignty and, in particular, the
risk of divergent interests among the people and their rulers, fairly
quickly generated a third core value of American law, which can be
characterized as the maintenance of maximum economic opportunity and social mobility. Pursuant to this ideal, Americans rejected the institution of privileged orders and social deference-because it led to the exercise of arbitrary powers-and fairly
early focused on the idea that oppression would be minimized and
something akin to democracy would be best assured by allowing
capable individuals to accumulate wealth and rise in social standing and commercial power. This principle of American law was in
full operation by the time of the Jacksonian entrepreneurs2 3 and
may have reached its fullest expression in Chief Justice Taney's
opinion in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge.2 This third
core value, however, was influential from the beginning of American history and manifested itself in a hatred both of the English
aristocratic feudal order and of any remnants of that order in the
English common law. One of the clearest early displays of this antipathy occurred in the late 1780's, when the Boston Merchant
Honestus questioned the need for lawyers, a group which he believed to be an unnecessary and odiously privileged class in a republic.25 Nevertheless, the principle did not receive what was probably its most coherent form until well into the nineteenth century,
when its most profound legal impact was to end the hegemony of
the rentier interest in American law and to substitute the ascendence of fluid, entrepreneurial, commercial, and manufacturing
23. For studies of how the egalitarian philosophy of the Jacksonian years included a
component that stressed the duty of each man enterpreneurially to accumulate as much
wealth as possible, see S. BRUCHEY, THE RoOTs OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 1607-1861,
at 193-207 (1968); S. PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, supra note 8, at 260-63; P. TEMIN, THE JACKSONIAN ECONOMY (1965).
24. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). See also K. NEwMYER, THE SutPRmME COuRT UNDER
MARSHALL AND TANEY 95-98 (1968).

In the Charles River Bridge case Chief Justice Taney

held that a new bridge company's charter was constitutional, even though it arguably contravened a conferral of an implied monopoly in an old bridge company's charter. See infra
notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
25.

B. Austin, Observations on the Pernicious Practiceof the Law, As Published Oc-

casionally in the Independent Chronicle in the Year 1786, at 7-10 (1819), reprinted in part
in S.

PRESSER

& J.

ZAINALDIN,

supra note 8, at 264-66.
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wealth.2 6

A final core value of American law began to evolve at the turn
of the nineteenth century, when it became increasingly evident
that democracy, social mobility, and the ideal of restraints on arbitrary power might best be realized if the legal system allowed the
primary economic and industrial development decisions to be directed by Adam Smith's "invisible hand.

'2 7

By according primacy

contract,28

American law increasto doctrines such as freedom of
ingly recognized that the national interest would best be served by
carving out a large sphere of private initiatives and interests-immune from governmental intervention or regulation-where the free market, rather than the state, might maximize development.29 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, this free enterprise ideal of the maximum protection
and promotion of private interests and initiativesbecame perhaps
the dominant value of American public and private law, although
it has lost considerable ground since the New Deal years. The ideal
of protected spheres of private interests was evident in crude form
in the early years following the American revolution-both in the
state declarations of rights3 1 and in the Federal Bill of Rights of
1791 32-although in those early years the primary protected private interests probably were more spiritual and political than economic in nature. Nevertheless, explicit reference in American law
to Smith's market-oriented views can be found as early as the Philadelphia Cordwainers trial in 1806.13
26. The manner in which the rentier interest-that is, the power, wealth, and influence of great landowners-lost out to entrepreneurial sectors in the battle over who ought to
benefit most from legal doctrines is the subject of M. HoRwrrz, supra note 4.
27. The "invisible hand" notion suggests that the accumulation and conflict of individual private interests will lead to the most efficient allocation of resources and production.
For an accessible introductory treatment of Smith's "invisible hand" idea, see R. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS 38-44 (rev. ed. 1967).
28. For descriptions of how freedom of contract became a dominant concept in antebellum law, see M. HoRwrrz, supra note 4; W. NELSON, supra note 5.
29. Cf. C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBES
To LOCKE 272-73 (1962) (discussing how Hobbes' and Locke's work has been interpreted in
modem democracies to support capitalist enterprise and individual effort).
30. See, e.g., S. PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, supra note 8, at 674-705 and sources cited

therein.
31. See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I, art. I ("inherent and unalienable rights" include
"acquiring possessing and protecting property"), reprinted in S. PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN,
supra note 8, at 114.
32. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV, and V (protection for religion, speech, privacy
in dwellings, and property).
33. Commonwealth v. Pullis, Mayor's Ct. of Philadelphia (1806).
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With these four core values of American legal history delineated, we now can articulate and evaluate the divergent approaches
that scholars have taken to the study of American legal history. In
elaborating upon these current schools of legal history, the next
part of the Article also suggests some of the outstanding writings
in the area that profitably might be consulted by beginners.
III.

CURRENT "SCHOOLS" OF AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY

Four schools of legal history are discernible from the current
literature in the area. This literature includes major works that are
representative of each school, as well as critical book reviews that
often are as important as the works themselves, in part because
they provide a format for the intellectual sniping that recently has
enlivened legal historical scholarship. As should be evident from
the discussion below, legal history, along with the subject of law
and economics," is today generating some of the most sharply divided scholarship in legal literature.
The first school of legal history that seems to be discernible
adopts the notion that law has followed an orderly evolution according to fixed intellectual principles and, thus, may be labelled
the "conservative school." These legal historians come closest to
replicating the thinking of the great English and American Whig
historians like Lord Macaulay or George Bancroft.3 5 To begin with
the first of several sweeping generalizations, the practitioners of
this school believe that the enterprise of legal decisionmaking
predominantly has proceeded according to certain neutral principles. They posit that although the substantive law might have varied over time and might have been created to meet particular social or economic needs, the basic principles of the law have not
changed. By focusing on the maintenance of particular principles,
the practitioners of this first school emphasize the first core value
of American law that was discussed aboves -- namely, the restraint
of arbitrary power, the "rule of law" itself, or, simply, the notion of
adherence to precedent.
34. For the latest examinations of law and economics, see Symposium on Efficiency as
a Legal Concern, 8 HoismR L. REv. 485 (1980); A Response to the Efficiency Symposium, 8
HoFsTmA L. Rzv. 811 (1980).
35. See, e.g., G. BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE UNrra STATES OF AMERICA, FROM THE
DIScoVzRY OF THE CoNTINENT (1883); H. ButrRnELD, THE WMo INTERPRETATION OF HisTORY (1931); T. MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE ACCESSION OP JAMES THE
SHCOND (1866).
36. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., for example, explained much of
American tort law by pointing to the courts' efforts to maintain the
principle of no liability without fault, and he explained much of
American and English contract law using the principle of consideration.37 Similarly, Roscoe Pound characterized legal developments
as the orderly evolution of legal doctrines brought about by judges'
searching for principles in previous cases and applying them to
new situations, a process which he described as a "taught legal tradition."3 8 G. Edward White, the latest proponent of this school,
pushes the analysis to a slightly different level," but he nevertheless contends that certain legal principles-mostly procedural
ones-circumscribe the role of judges and ensure that they adhere
to a coherent "American judicial tradition.

40

The common thread

that ties together the work of all these scholars, then, is a primary
emphasis on intellectual judging paradigms and a relegation of economic, political, and social influences to a secondary level.
The practitioners of the second group of legal historians, the
"Wisconsin school,

4

1

view economic needs as the primary determi-

nants of law. Although any generalization slights the subtlety of
the school's best analysis, its adherents widely perceive law as a
tool to be used by the most productive sectors of American society
in "releasing their energy. '"'2 This group as a rule focuses primarily
on the third core value discussed above of maintaining maximum
economic progress and social mobility.' 3 Adherents of the Wiscon-

sin school apparently are more prepared than their conservative
school counterparts to conclude that judges, legislators, lawyers,
and other actors in the legal system often have been willing to
abolish even the most fundamental principles or tenets of legal
doctrines in the promotion of economic progress, and that the law
can be almost totally malleable in the hands of those bent on
37.

See

O.W.

HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881).

38. See R. PoUND, THE FoRMATivE ERA OF AMERCAN LAW (1938).
39. Although White appears to recognize to a greater degree than Pound or Holmes
that judges self-consciously may be molding doctrines that are influenced by current political issues, he still finds dominant elements that continue from John Marshall to Earl Warren. G. WHITr, supra note 5.
40. Id.
41. This group is so named because its most distinguished practitioners taught or
studied at the University of Wisconsin Law School. See White, Book Review, 59 VA. L.
Rzv. 1130, 1132 (1973).
42. See J. HuRsT, LAw AND THE CONDMONS OF FREEDOM iN THz NINETEENTH CENTURY
UNITED STATES 3-32 (1956).
43. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
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achieving their economic or political ends." Practitioners of the
two schools seem to agree, however, that legal change reflects a
fundamental societal consensus on the appropriate values and
principles of the legal system. The Wisconsin school thus'explains
much of nineteenth-century legal development as the result
of many-if not all-Americans concluding after the rise of the
Jacksonian entrepreneurs 45 that democracy could best be achieved
by promoting economic progress and social mobility. 4' If de
Tocqueville's findings are still considered valid, the evidence sup47
porting this conclusion certainly seems strong.
The work of the third school of legal history, of which Morton
J. Horwitz is perhaps the chief proponent, 48 shares with the Wisconsin school a focus on both the economic implications of legal
doctrines and the economic influences that create those doctrines."
The practitioners of this "radical transformation school," however,
reject some of the relatively benign implications of the Wisconsin
school's historiography. 50 Instead of accepting that changes in
American law have transpired because of a consensus on appropriate legal values, for example, Horwitz suggests that a minority
comprised of merchants, industrial entrepreneurs, and lawyers--foisted a new legal order on an unwilling-or at least a hoodwinked-general populace.5 1 According to this view, late eighteenth-century contract law focused primarily on principles of
substantive equity, including such formidable doctrines as the
sound price rule,5 ' and the law in general was administered principally through the equitable discretion of juries. Horwitz, however,
44.

See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 14 ("The basic premise of this book is that

despite a strong dash of history and idiosyncrasy, the strongest ingredient in American law,
at any given time, is the present: current emotions, real economic interests, concrete political groups.").

45. See supra note 23.
46. See, e.g., J. HuRsT, supra note 42 (nineteenth-century law promoted a "release of
energy" to secure the widest benefits of the American Revolution's political gains).
47. See I & 11 A. DE ToQuEvILLE, DEMOcRcY IN AMERCA (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
48. See M. HoRwrrz, supra note 4.
49. Id. at xvi ("American legal system after the Revolution was transformed successfully to promote developmental goals.").
50. See Tushnet, Perspectives on the Development of American Law: A CriticalReview of Friedman's "A History of American Law," 1977 Wis. L. REv. 81.
51. For an explanation and critique of his analysis, see Presser, Revising the Conservative Tradition:Towards a New American Legal History, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 700 (1977),
reprinted in LAW IN THE AmICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 113.
52. The payment of a "sound price" creates an enforceable, implied obligation that
the goods purchased be "sound"-that is, fit for the purpose for which they were purchased.
See M. HoRwrrz, supra note 4, at 161-73, 180.
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argues that in the nineteenth century the rule of caveat emptor
replaced the sound price rule, the rules of contract generally were
rigidified, and juries were forced more often to accept and act on
the law as the judges delivered it to them.58 According to Horwitz,
certainty replaced equity as the central value of contract law, and
the market mentality of industrial capitalism replaced the communitarian mentality of preindustrial America." Putting the work of
this school into the scheme of values that this Article has delineated then, Horwitz and others of his school are most interested in
pursuing the conflict between the value of popular sovereignty 5 5 -to the extent that this value might be interpreted to dictate adherence to widely shared community standards of fairness
maximum economic opand equity-and the value of maintaining
56
mobility.
social
portunity and
At least one commentator has called Horwitz' work marxist,7
and, indeed, some of his views on the evolution of contract law do
sound similar to Marx' notorious assertion in The Poverty of Philosophy that "[t]he Handmill gives you society with the feudal
lord; the steam mill, society with the industrial capitalist."5 8 According to Horwitz, the merchant and entrepreneurial class, once it
gained ascendence in American society, proceeded to refashion the
law to prevent further fundamental change and to ensure its continued dominance.5 9 Horwitz argues that this development led to a
period of "formalism" in the law which began in the middle of the
nineteenth century 0 and to an era of outrageous and inequitable
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 180, 197-201.
See id.; Presser, supra note 51.
See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. In his recent excellent work on the

law of slavery, Mark Tushnet, the most prolific writer of the radical transformation school,
described a similar conflict in Southern slavery law as "the competing pressures of humanity
and interest." M. TUSHNET, THs AmRcAN LAw OF SLAvRRY 1810-1860: CONSmERArONS OF

HuMANITY AND INTREsT 5-6 (1981).
57. See, e.g., Nelson, Legal and ConstitutionalHistory, 1978 ANN. SuRV. AM. LAw 395,
397. Some of the other scholars in this school-for example, Tushnet and Feinman-use the
theories of Marxism much more explicitly than Horwitz. See, e.g., Feinman, The Role of
Ideas in Legal History,78 MICH.L. Rav. 722 (1980); Tushnet, A Marxist Analysis of American Law, 1 MARXIST PEnsps. 96 (1979).
58. K. MARX, THE PovERTY OF PH.osoPHY 202 (n.d.), quoted in P. SINGER, MARX 36

(1980).
59. M. HORwITZ, supra note 4, at 266.
60. Id. at 253-66. The idea of formalism as an exclusive, dominant, and deceptive
strategy of jurisprudence apparently is no longer tenable. See, e.g., Presser, JudicialAjax:
John Thompson Nixon and the Federal Courts of New Jersey in the Late Nineteenth
Century, 76 Nw. U.L. Rav. 423, 426 (1981), and sources cited therein. A distinctive, bom-

1982]

LEGAL HISTORY

maldistribution of American society's material assets. 1 Unlike
Marx, however, Horwitz does not necessarily view the development
of the means of production as the primary force in history, nor
does he appear to share the classic Marxist idea that the inevitability of certain dialectical transformations in society ultimately will
lead to a proletarian revolution and a withering away of the state.
Nevertheless, one can find a strain of utopian socialism in Horwitz'
work, which manifests itself in his belief that if America can free
itself from the constraints of nineteenth-century legal concepts, it
might be able to fashion a truly equitable legal system.' Horwitz
presumably believes society then could return to some of the organizing principles of an earlier, uncorrupted America.
When Horwitz won Columbia's Bancroft Price in 1977, he naturally became a prominent target for criticism. Some commentators have suggested that these critical attacks have devastated his
scholarship,6 3 but this proposition goes too far. The criticisms usually have focused on Horwitz' use of relatively few cases to support
his assertions, on other cases or legal sources that contradict his
readings of doctrinal development, or on his reliance upon authority from only a particular area of the country." These criticisms
bastic judicial style clearly existed in the late nineteenth century, but it may have reflected
the resurgence of individualistic religious and moral fervor following the chaos of the American Civil War as much as it did a particular class attempt to impose its hegemony through
the law. Id. at 427-28. Horwitz, of course, does not argue in The Transformationof American Law that late nineteenth-century formalism represented some sort of self-conscious
conspiracy on the part of judges and other legal figures. See Presser, Book Review, 22 AM. J.
LEG. HisT. 359 (1978). Nevertheless, considering the prevalence and inevitability of "bourgeois individualism" in nineteenth-century American political life, one must question Horwitz' frequent use of the "deception" or "concealment" metaphor for what transpired in
American legal history. Cf. C. MACPHWISON, supra note 29, at 262-77 (underlying unit of
English political thought from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries was based on the
concept of "possessive individualism" from sixteenth-century political courts).
61. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 4, at 253-66.
62. See, e.g., Horwitz, The Legacy of 1776 in Legal and Economic Thought, 19 J. L. &
EcoN. 621 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Legacy]; Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified
Human Good? (Book Review), 86 YALE L.J. 561 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Book Review].
Horwitz' concentration on the limiting effects of dominant legal paradigms reflects the influence of Thomas Kuhn's book, THE STRumvCUR OF Scimrrn'c RvOLUTnON (2d ed. 1971). See
Horwitz, The Conservative Traditionin the Writing of American Legal History, 17 AM. J.
LEG. HisT. 275, 282-83 (1973) [hereinafter cited as The Conservative Tradition].Horwitz'
work thus appears to bear a strong resemblance to the work of the European "structuralist
Marxists," who explored the limiting characteristics of intellectual paradigms-i.e., the
"structures" of human thought and action. See D. McCLELLAN, MARXmsM ArrR MARX, 298306 (1979) and sources cited therein.
63. See, e.g., Scheiber, Public Economic Policy and the American Legal System: Historical Perspectives, 1980 Wis. L. Rav. 1159, 1168 n.45, and sources cited therein.
64. Id.; see generally, Bridwell, Theme v. Reality in American Legal History, 53 IND.
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for the most part are well reasoned, but their total impact may be
less than the sum of their parts. Horwitz, as well as other members
of the radical transformation school, still have much to contribute
to our understanding both of the nature of change in the legal order and of how the work of particular actors influences others.
Critics of this school often appear not to realize that one essential
premise in the radical transformation theorists' work is that while
the way society thinks about the law may change dramatically, at
any given point in time only certain elements of the changes are
perceptible.05 Furthermore, Horwitz and his colleagues appear to
assert that some doctrines of the law, or some legal actors, may at
any given time be much more influential than others.66 Thus, even
if only five out of fifty cases decided at a particular time support
their view, they might argue that those five decisions signal a dominant attitudinal change and thus should be entitled to the most
weight in any analysis. Horwitz, therefore, generates criticism simply because he must deal with any historian's most perplexing
problem-namely, assigning weight and order to a virtually infinite
and contradictory body of fact. Since Horwitz' strong polemical
statements often obscure this methodological problem, however,
his critics have had an easy time pointing out evidence that contradicts his thesis.
On a final-and paradoxical 7-note before considering the
last group of legal historians, the work of the radical transformation and conservative schools of legal history share a common
problem: both schools-and, to a more limited extent, the Wisconsin school-base their historical interpretations on elusive premises concerning both the subjective nature of the nineteenth-century legal mind and how various patterns of thought influenced the
law and each other. Since patterns of thought do not lend themselves to exact empirical verification, their theses are impossible
ultimately to prove or disprove. To the extent that the radical
transformation school explores the availability of competing intellectual paradigms-indeed, this type of inquiry lies at the heart of
L.J. 449 (1978).
65. See, e.g., M. HORWITZ, supra note 4, at 1-30 (discussing the emergence of an "instrumental conception" of law).
66. For instance, Horwitz' analysis suggests that Joseph Story is perhaps the beat example of a jurist who was much more influential than others. Id. at 38-39, 55-56, 112, 118,
196-97, 205, 248-52, 258.
67. The radical transformationists level their most rigorous criticisms at the work of
the conservatives. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 57; The Conservative Tradition, supra
note 62.
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the radical transformation thesis's-its analysis is inherently more
satisfying than that of either the conservative school or the Wisconsin school, since the availability of competing intellectual paradigms appears to be an inevitable result of the competing values
that are inherent in our legal culture.6 '
Viewed in this light, the radical transformation approach to
legal history resembles the final discernible school of thought,
which can be likened to Elizabethan tragedy or Greek mythology
because it focuses on great men of the law. Like Horwitz, the proponents of the "heroic school" of legal history believe that exploring all the empirical minutiae of the law may prove misleading or
counter-productive. Unlike the radical transformation theorists,
however, heroic school historians believe that psychological and
philosophical problems of the human condition determine their
subjects' legal behavior more than do the means of production or
economic development. In particular, heroic school historians
study the ways in which their subjects constructed legal systems
that initially were intended to resolve personal internal conflicts,
but which were later applied in an effort to heal general societal
conflicts. Heroic school scholars, therefore, are most comfortable in
the mode of biography, and Leonard Levy's and Robert Cover's
works on Chief Justice Shaw7" are indicative of this preference.
Levy and Cover do not view Shaw and his legal decisions either as
the products of the economics of his time or as the results of a
particular legal tradition, but rather as the results of the sheer
force of his own personality. These authors believe that Shaw used
his dynamic personality to implement a passionate commitment to
particular and conflicting social, ethical, and political values that
were not necessarily accepted in the legal system which existed at
the time. Levy and Cover, for example, identify a central problem
in Shaw's deep commitments both to abolish slavery and to preserve the federal union-namely, that the commitments place in
conflict the legal values of democracy, private ordering, and adherence to the existing legal order.71 Thus, the authors present
Shaw's slavery decisions as an effort to resolve his inner conflict
through the law. In following Shaw's attempts to determine the
68. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
69.

See supra notes 11-33 and accompanying text.

70. See R. Covan, JusTicE AcCUSED: ANTI-SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975);
L. LEVY, THE LAW OF TH COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957).
71. See R. CoVER, supra note 70, at 227-58, 249-56; L. LEVY, supra note 70, at 315-21,
323-30, 332-36.
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proper obeisance to be accorded particular personal values or their
legal analogues-in other words, in studying the allocative process
of the heroic judge-the writer and the reader leave the realm of
law and enter the realm of justice.
The heroic writers' perspective, therefore, is neither provincial
nor particularly legal; on the contrary, it is universal. These writers
transcend the four legal values delineated above because their
work usually goes beyond the doctrines to study personalities.
Nevertheless, one might characterize their work as the study of
human attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable aspects of various
legal and personal values. As Peter Teachout recently declared, the
writers in this school are not really generating historical scholarship; they are producing literature.7 2 These writers-among whom
the author immodestly includes himself73-do not prove assertions
by exhaustively marshalling and analyzing vast amounts of data.
They probably perceive that an empirical analysis of law cannot be
performed comfortably in a human lifetime and inevitably would
lead to contradictory interpretations.'
Instead, therefore, they
have written relatively short essays that are essentially more literary than historical. 5
As Teachout has suggested, Gilmore remains the most visible
practitioner of this methodology, 8 and his writing indeed may be
works of allegory rather than history.7 7 He rejects the conceptualists such as Holmes, Langdell, and Williston who would impose a
rigid authoritarian order of "classical contract doctrines," perhaps
because of weaknesses within themselves. 7 8 Gilmore's heroes are
the Corbins, the Llewellyns, and, indeed, the Gilmores-greatspirited men who would infuse the law with pluralism, humanity,
72. Teachout, Gilmore's New Book: Turning and Turning in the Widening Gyre
(Book Review), 2 VT. L. Rxv. 229 (1977).
73. See, e.g., Presser, supra note 60; Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters,
Samuel Chase, and the Broken Promiseof FederalistJurisprudence,73 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 26
(1978).
74. See Gordon, Book Review, 1974 Wis. L. Rzv. 1216, 1238-39.
75. Some radical transformation work also lends itself to this "literary" characterization. Horwitz' book, for example, might be described as "Dark and Dostoyevskyan." See
Presser, supra note 51, at 700.
76. See generally Teachout, supra note 72.
77. See, e.g., G. GmMoRE, THE AGES OF AmucRAN LAw (1977); G. GmMopm, THE DEATH
OF CoNTRAr (1974).

78. For Gilmore's explanation of the influence of Langdell, Holmes, and Williston on
the rise of the "classical" theory of contract, see G. GumomR, THE DEATH OF CoNTRACT,
supra note 77.
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and flexibility.79 Gilmore uses his allegory of these legal figures to
show us both how bad the law might be or might become and how
one might seek good and avoid evil.80 He fears the new conceptualists like Posner-and, perhaps Horwitz-and warns of the injustices of magnificient Langdellian Gothic legal cathedrals.81 Although Richard Speidel has argued that Gilmore's description of
these legal giants' work is based more on myth or fantasy than reality,82 his criticism may be off the mark. Gilmore, like the
Greeks,"3 perceives that myth is often greater than reality.8
While each legal history school culls reality to organize their
interpretations and create myths about the law, the heroic
school-more than the others-constructs myths that underscore
the uncertainty and paradoxes of life. In this way the heroic
school's myths more closely resemble those of the great Greek writers of tragedy and epic poetry. Another distinctive characteristic of
the heroic school is a nuance that Teachout appears to devine from
Gilmore 8s-the recognition of the Elizabethan 8 character of legal
man in general and of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in particular.
According to Teachout, Gilmore, by reminding us both of Holmes'
colossal creativity and of his massive insensitivity, "pulls into
sharp focus the powerful contradictions in his character and
thought, and explores searchingly the paradoxical connections be79. Gilmore's general tendency is to lavish praise on Corbin and censure on Langdell,
Holmes, and Williston. Id. Corbin best captures what Gilmore lauds in the one-volume student edition of his famous treatise, Contracts. A CORBIN, CONTRACTS (1952). Llewellyn also
demonstrates the humanistic sympathies that Gimore seems to praise. See K. LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1954).
80. See Teachout, supra note 72.

81. Id. at 235-37, 268.
82. See Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1975).

83. The suggestion that myth is greater than reality, for example, may be interpreted
as a central theme of Plato's Republic. One can discern this theme both in his theory of the
ideal forms (Books V and VII) and in his comments that his guardians must not be taught

the works of some of the great Greek poets lest the poets' critical views of the gods corrupt
them (Books II and III).
84. This cryptic statement simply means that since myth need not be circumscribed
by what actually occurs, its range is great: since it need not take account of the complexities
of reality, its power of expression is more perfect. Because myth, if believed, is as influential
as reality, its power to influence may thus be greater.
85. Teachout, supra note 72 at 254-55 n.90.
86. Teachout's source for the description of Elizabethan character is D. BUSH,
PREFACES TO RENAISSANCE LITERATURE 89 (1966), cited in Teachout, supra note 72, at 255 n.
90. Perhaps one of Shakespeare's best demonstrations of the duality of man's nature is the
tragedy of Leontes, which is found in the first half of The Winter's Tale.
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This paradox might

tween Holmes's darker and nobler natures.

be referred to as Elizabethan because late Renaissance thought in
England was characterized by its recognition of the "troubled, even
despairing, sense of man's inescapable duality, of his being pulled
at once toward the bestial and the angelic."' 8 This view enables
Gilmore and the other proponents of the heroic school to embrace
at once, as did the Greeks and the Elizabethans, "lower depths and
loftier heights and richer tensions"89 than are included in the views
that practitioners of the other schools espouse. This quasi-literary
view of man as inherently complex and contradictory better enables heroic school historians to describe legal development; it at
least enables them to communicate their insights more immediately to the reader. The practitioners of the fourth school thus are
better equipped to account simultaneously for all the inconsistent
core values in American law than are the writers who adhere to the
other schools.
Like the conservative school scholars, then, the heroic school
legal historians are interested primarily in the intellectual paradigms that their subjects utilized. The writings of the heroic
school, however, posit the existence of conflicting and competing
elements within the thought and philosophy of their subjects to a
greater extent than does the work of the conservatives. Like the
writers of other forms of literature, the writers of the fourth school
assume that man is after more than mere economic survival, and
they study legal man as he searches for spiritual as well as temporal salvation. Many of these characteristic elements of heroic
school writings appear in the work of other schools. In particular,
adherents of the radical transformation school 9 -- particularly Horwitz-exhibit messianic or millenarian elements in their work and
are preoccupied with questions of justice and of human salvation.9 1
Nevertheless, while the radical transformationists ultimately seem
to believe that justice will best be secured-and a high quality of
life best assured-through a fundamental redistribution of material wealth and a new communitarian attitude in the law, the work
of the fourth school suggests no such prescription for utopia. He87. Teachout, supra note 72, at 255.
88. Id.; see supra note 86.
89. D. BUSH, supra note 86, at 89, quoted in Teachout, supra note 72, at 255 n.90.
90. See supra notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
91. For statements of Horwitz' belief that society might be improved if we could shed
the odious aspects of our "rule of law" see Legacy, supra note 62; Book Review, supra note
62.
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roic school scholars simply imply that to the extent salvation and a
high quality of life are attainable, they will come only through individual striving and concentration on the unique characteristics
and potential of particular individuals, rather than through concerted action based on the needs of the entire community. The
fourth school's "heroic" concern, therefore, is more often with how
the law enables heroic individuals to flourish, than with how some
group might have misused the law to oppress the masses, or with
how the law might be reformed to terminate the inherent alienation among the people and their rulers in an atomistic market
society.
In sum, the four schools of legal history outlined above probably can be classified and distinguished according to their preoccupations with particular aspects of American law's four leading
values. Thus, conservative school writers emphasize the first or
paramount core value of the restraint of arbitrary power and the
adherence to the rule of law concept.92 Wisconsin school scholars,
on the other hand, draw insights from the third value of American
law-the maintenance of maximum economic opportunity and social mobility.93 Members of the radical transformation school are
preoccupied with questions of how the notion of popular sovereignty or democracy can be preserved and shielded from the arbitrary power that the law's promotion of economic progress creates. " ' Finally, heroic school writers concentrate on the
contributions to the American legal culture of strong individuals,
and, in so doing, they often consider the fourth value of American
law-the maintenance of maximum freedom for private initiative.' This fourth value, more than any other, recognizes the need
for competing conceptions of what is good for society and suggests
that conflicts between and among the other legal values create a
need for individuals to reach creative, unique, and different resolutions of the ordering of priorities in implementing the values of
American law.
With the four values and the four schools of American legal
history thus examined, this Article next suggests several ways in
which the in-sights gained from current studies in legal history-particularly from the characterization of American legal history as a series of conflicts over competing values-might be inte92.
93.
94.
95.

See
See
See
See
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grated into classroom teaching. Under the rubric of each school of
legal history, the Article examines several approaches that law
professors might adopt to use the history of law to illuminate current issues in their courses. Many of these approaches will be familiar to most professors; several are traditional "old chestnuts" of
law teaching. The aim, however, is to suggest how the "old
chestnuts," together with some new developments in legal historiography, might be employed to provide law students with a deeper
understanding of American law. Ultimately, the digestion of these
insights with the other classroom materials might lead to the satisfaction of law students' hunger for spiritual as well as instrumental
instruction. This possibility is particularly likely in first-year
courses, both because the first year is the most shattering, penetrating, and powerful experience for law students and because the
need for unifying philosophical explanations is strongest during
that time.e
IV.

SELECTED APPROACHES TO INTEGRATING AMERICAN LEGAL

HISTORY INTO LEGAL EDUCATION

A.

The Conservative School and the Containment of Arbitrary
Power by the Rule of Law
1. Contracts

The dispute between Sir Edward Coke and James I over the
extent of the royal prerogative and its possible circumscription by
the English common law 7 provides perhaps the greatest vehicle for
the use of historical episodes in contracts courses to explain the
emergence of the rule of law as a restraint on arbitrary power. Although almost all contracts teachers probably make at least some
reference to the conflict between the common-law and equity
courts in the early seventeenth century, focusing on the several
face-to-face confrontations between Coke-as the common law's
representative-and assorted royal officials is perhaps the best way
to illuminate this historical controversy. Professors should comment on Coke's disputes over the question whether the King
should be subject to the constraints of the common law with Chancellors Ellesmere and Bacon, as the representatives of the preroga96. Most of the approaches suggested below are drawn from materials in first-year
courses-particularly contracts--because these are the courses with which most legal historians teaching in law schools are familiar.
97. For an excellent treatment of this conflict, see C. BowFN, THE LION AND THE
THRONE 291-306 (1956).
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tive courts of equity, with Archbishop Bancroft, as the representative of the Ecclesiastical Court of High Commission, and, finally,
with James I himself. Although the conflict began as a personal
struggle between Coke and the King and his ministers, it concluded with the assertion of parliamentary sovereignty and the execution of James' successor, Charles I, during the English Civil
Wars. This struggle, therefore, is fascinating both for what it
reveals about the emergence of the rule of law as a restraint on
arbitrary power and for what it eventually signified in the American and English revolutions-namely, the idea that the English
common law and the "fundamental rights of Englishmen" embody
the essence of popular sovereignty.9 8
While this episode provides the traditional historical tool for
underscoring the difficulties of concentrating discretion in equity
judges, a great many other developments in early American history
are instructive when addressing the core value of restraining arbitrary power. Perhaps the most helpful of these historical developments is the hostility with which Americans came to view the colonial Vice-Admiralty courts, which operated without juries.
Examining that hostility naturally leads to the question of how the
arbitrary power of jury discretion might itself frustrate contracts,
and one ultimately might suggest that colonial reliance on juries
-because of the colonists' belief in popular sovereignty -resulted
in a conflict between the American legal values of popular sovereignty and the restraint of arbitrary power. Horwitz/ 9 William
Nelson,10 0 and John Reid '0 1 have shown that colonial juries often
used their equitable discretion to enforce popular prejudices, and
this practice occasionally extended to voiding contracts that the
English common law might have enforced.102 In short, reference to
English and American colonial history enables a contracts professor to explore one dimension of a traditional conflict in contracts
courses-the conflict between certainty and equity.
When exploring the arbitrary operation of equity, one should
always consider the methodological comments of perhaps our most
famous Chancellor, James Kent, who said,
98. See, e.g., B. BAiLYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969).
99. M. HORWITZ, supra note 4.
100. W. NELSON, supra note 5.
101. J. REID, IN A DEFIANT STANCE: THE CONDITIONS OF LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS BAY,
THE IRISH COMPARISON, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

102.

Id.

27-28 (1977).
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In 1814 I was appointed Chancellor. The office I took with considerable
reluctance. . .The person who left it was stupid, and it is a curious fact
that for the nine years I was in that office there was not a single decision,
opinion, or dictum of either of my two predecessors.

.

. ,

from 1777 to 1814,

cited to me or even suggested. I took the court as if it has been a new institution, and never before known in the United States. I had nothing to guide
me, and was left at liberty to assume all such English Chancery powers and
jurisdiction as I thought applicable under our Constitution. This gave me
grand scope ....
My practice was, first, to make myself perfectly and accurately ...
master of the facts.. .. I saw where justice lay, and the moral sense decided
the [cause] half the time; and I then sat down to search the authorities until I
had [exhausted] my books. I might once in a while be embarrassed by a
technical rule, but I most always found principles suited to my views of the
case ....203
2.

Constitutional Law

One advantage of an historical approach to American law that
emphasizes the overarching values of American legal culture is that
it illuminates the correspondence between American public and

private law. 1 "4 Accordingly, the same difficulties with arbitrary
power that are evident in contracts doctrines can be observed in
the principles of American constitutional law. One prominent ex-

ample illustrates the underpinnings of the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 105 In the
"Writs of Assistance"1 0 6 case of 1761 the court considered whether

colonial customs officials forcibly could search homes for contraband without first obtaining a special search warrant from a responsible magistrate that clearly identified the premises to be
searched and the goods sought. English statutes authorized warrantless searches pursuant to "Writs of Assistance," which the
Court of Exchequer routinely issued to customs officials when they
assumed office.10 7 The practice appears to have been followed in
103. W. KENT, MEMomS AND LErERs OF JAMEs KENT, LL.D. 157-59 (1898).
104. Cf. Hall, Book Review 77 Nw. U.L. Rsv. 112 (1982) (reflecting on the need to
integrate the fields of constitutional and legal history).
105. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The fourth amendment states that
[Tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
106. Paxton's Case of the Writ of Assistance, Quincy's Mass. Reports 51 (Sup. Ct. of
the Province of Mass. 1761); see S. PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, supra note 8, at 61-89; M.
SMrrH, THE Warrs OF AssISTANCE CASE (1978).
107. See 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAmS 106-23 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965).
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Massachusetts from 1755 until 1761, when, for various personal
and political reasons, James Otis, Jr., a brilliant and fiery lawyer
who was soon to emerge as a leader of the Whig opposition to England, appeared in Massachusetts court to challenge the legality of
the writs. 10 8 Although Otis might have used several sophisticated
and technical arguments to suggest that the English statutes authorizing the issuance of the general writs of assistance were inapplicable in America, 10 ' he instead grounded his argument on the
assertion that employment of the writs constituted an absolutist
exercise reminiscent of King John's and the Stuarts' abuses of the
prerogative and, therefore, was "constitutionally" impermissible.
Otis accused the writs of being "the worst instrument of arbitrary
power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of the constitution, that ever was found in an English
law-book." 110 Otis reminded his listeners that such exercises of arbitrary power had "cost one King of England his head [Charles I]
and another [James H] his Throne."""" Pointing to the "fundamental principle" of the English Constitution that would justify invalidating the writs, Otis announced that "one of the most essential
branches of English liberty . . . is the freedom of one's house. A
man's house is his castle;. . . and while he is quiet, he is as well
guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ... would totally annihilate this privilege."'
Attempting to bolster his arguments with a dubious misreading of Coke's opinion in Dr.Bonham's Case,113 Otis demanded that
the Massachusetts court throw out the writs because "AN ACT
AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION IS VOID. 1 1 4 Although Otis
eventually lost this particular battle, his ardent rhetoric had two
108. M. SmrrH, supra note 106, at 216-17.
109. Otis, for example, could have argued that English statutes ought to be construed
as not condoning "general" warrants. He also could have argued that the practices of the
Exchequer court could not be duplicated in America. See 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS,
supra note 107, at 106-23.
110. S. PsssER & J. ZAINALDIN, supra note 8, at 69 (quoting Massachusetts Spy, April
29, 1773, at 3, cola. 1-3).

111. Id.
112. Id. at 70.
113. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K B. 1610) (according to the principles of
the English common law, a statute could not be construed to make the Royal College of
Physicians both a party and a judge in the same case). For the most lucid discussions of this
"misreading" of Coke to find a general principle of the common law that permitted courts to
invalidate parliamentary legislation as "unconstitutional," see 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AmmucAN REVOLUTION 1750-1776, at 411-13 (B. Bailyn ed. 1965), and sources cited therein.
114. S. PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, supra note 8, at 71 (quoting Massachusetts Spy,
supra note 110).
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profound effects on American law. First, constitutional protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures became enshrined in the
Bill of Rights,115 and, second, the notion of judicial review of legislation based on the principles and provisions of a constitution became the most original and enduring institution of American government.111 The federal constitution's permanent establishment of
judicial review resulted from myriad causes, but the principal one
appears to have been the commercial uncertainty that the excessively democratic and prodebtor state legislation created during
the period in which the Articles of Confederation were in force.117
Although the arguments for the institution of judicial review may
have been couched in terms of popular sovereignty, 1 " the fear of
arbitrary power permeates the philosophy of judicial review, which
in its early American manifestations was shaped by the historical
abuses of the English royal prerogative.
3. Antitrust Law
By the late nineteenth century, the legal and cultural value of
restraining arbitrary power in America had become divorced from
its foundations in resistance to Stuart absolutism. Fears that society once had directed against human beings began to be focused on
supposedly impersonal, artificial creations--the American corporations. Instructors can pursue this aspect of the historical theme in
many contexts, but it is perhaps best considered in the framework
of the evolution of federal antitrust law in America. The passage of
the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890119 may have constituted no
more than a cosmetic gesture by a business-dominated Congress
that was intent on quieting a massive public uproar by producing
"some bill headed: 'A Bill to Punish Trusts' with which to go to
the country."120 Whatever the intention of the Act's drafters, however, the judicial perception that corporations were odious instruments of arbitrary power led the courts to attempt to restrain that
115.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

116. For the classic theoretical statement of this notion, see THE FEDERALIsT No. 78
(A. Hamilton). See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). A bolder articulation
of the doctrine by a Federalist judge can be found in Chase's opinion in United States v.
Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 254-58 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709).

117. See G. WOOD, supra note 98, at 403-25.
118.

Id. at 453-63, see THE FEDERAusT No. 78, supra note 116.

119. Ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)).
120. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHi. L. Rzv.
221, 221 n.4 (1956) (quoting L. COOLIDGE, AN OLD-FAsHIONED SENATOR: ORVILLE H. PLATr
444 (1919)).
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perceived arbitrary power through the antitrust laws. This development illustrates the importance of American cultural values
both as social forces acting on-but ultimately independent
of-legislators and as ideas capable of turning a legal placebo into
a potent instrument of regulation or reform.
Prior to the Sherman Act state courts first articulated a "devil
theory" of corporations. Some members of Congress had alluded to
this notion in their rhetoric during the debates over the 1890
Act, 121 and the courts that subsequently interpreted the statute
seemed to adopt the view rather consistently. In Central Ohio Salt
Co. v. Guthrie,2 2 for example, the state court declared that the
"inevitable tendency" of manufacturers to allocate territories between themselves was "injurious to the public," and that even if
such agreements were deemed not to have resulted either in the
destruction of competition or in an unreasonable increase in price,
courts would not enforce them because agreements among competitors eventually would damage the public.12 8 Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court remarked in Richardson v. Buh 1 24 that this
damage naturally resulted because "[tihe sole object of [such a]
corporation is to make money, by having it in its power to raise the
price of the article, or diminish the quantity to be made and used,
at its pleasure."12 15 The Richardson court stated that these corporations were nefarious, "artificial person[s], governed by a single
motive or purpose, which is to accumulate money regardless of the
wants or necessities of over 60,000,000 people. ' 12' Reflecting the
deep-seated American fear of arbitrary power, the court concluded
that the tendency of any monopoly was "destructive of free institutions, and repugnant to the instincts of a free people, and contrary
to the whole scope and spirit of the federal constitution . ...,,12
In sum, these courts were engaging in an elaborate exercise of reifying corporations'2s-imagining these "artificial beings" as blood121.

See, e.g., 21 CONG. Rec. 2457 (1890) (Senator Sherman's statement that combina-

tions in restraint of trade smacked of "kingly prerogative"); S. PREssER & J. ZAINALDIN,
supra note 8,at 584 (quoting 21 CONG. Rxc. 2726 (1890) (Senator Edmunds stated that "all

human experience and all human philosophy have proved that [monopolies] are destructive
of the public welfare and come to be tyrannies, grinding tyrannies.")). See generally infra
notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
122. 35 Ohio St. 666 (1880).
123. Id. at 672.
124. 77 Mich. 632, 43 N.W. 1102 (1889).
125. Id. at 657, 43 N.W. at 1110.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 658, 43 N.W. at 1110.
128. For a discussion of the "reification" of the corporation, see R. WINTER, GOVERN-
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less monsters that were unmoved by any human feelings and bent
simply on monetary gain at public expense.
Senate proponents of the Sherman Antitrust Act also focused
on this theme. John Sherman himself declared that trusts were
governed only by "[t]he law of selfishness, uncontrolled by competition, [which] compels [them] to disregard the interest of the consumer." 129 Sherman expressly linked the bill to the fear of Stuart
absolutism by concluding that a trust controlled by a single man
"is a kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of government
... .,,130 Senator Edmunds joined Sherman and declared that the
bill was necessary to "repress and break up and destroy forever"
monopolies such as the sugar and oil trusts "because in the long
run, however seductive they may appear in lowering prices to the
consumer, for the time being, all human experience and all human
philosophy has proved that they are destructive of the public welfare and come to be tyrannies, grinding tyrannies."",, Unfortunately, the Senator never explained what he meant by the phrase
"all human experience and all human philosophy." Indeed, the
drafters of the Sherman Act clearly did not intend to proscribe all
monopolies, but only 13those that the common law would have
deemed impermissible. 1
Even though the common law may have supported the condemnation of only those monopolies that operated "unreasonably"
to restrain trade, some of the earliest constructions of the Sherman
Act suggested that the statutory language prohibited all agreements in restraint of trade. 3 8 In the first Supreme Court opinion
to adopt this position, Justice Peckham apparently rejected a "rule
of reason" analysis because of his personal ideology, which emphasized the legal restraint of big business' arbitrary power. Peckham,
for example, repeated the state court litany that trusts or
MENT AND THE CORPORATION

(1978).

129. S. PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, supra note 8,at 581 (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 2457
(1890)). For the entire debate, see 21 CONG. REC. 2456-68 (1890).
130. S. PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, supra note 8, at 581 (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 2457
(1890)).
131. Id. at 584.
132. See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 2457-68 (1890). See generally, Letwin, supra note 120,
221-43 (1956). For the English common law authorities, see Letwin, The English Common
Law ConcerningMonopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 355 (1954) (although English common law
condemned prerogative grants of monopoly, engrossing and charging extortionate prices for
necessities, unreasonable agreements not to compete between employers and employees, and
certain conspiracies to raise or lower wages, its proscriptions were not as broad as the provisions of the Sherman Act).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
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combinations
all have an essential similarity, and have been induced by motives of individual or corporate aggrandizement as against the public interest. In business or
trading combinations they may even temporarily, or perhaps permanently,
reduce the price of the article traded in or manufactured, by reducing the
expense inseparable from the running of many different companies for the
3
same purpose.' '

Peckham also observed that although these combinations might
provide some cost savings for consumers, their ultimate result
would be to drive "out of business the small dealers and worthy
men whose lives have been spent therein, and who might be unable
to readjust themselves to their altered surroundings. Mere reduction in the price of the commodity.
might be dearly paid for by
the ruin of such a class . . . . ,,1"5 While acknowledging that this
dislocation inevitably might result from the normal course of
changes in business methods, Peckham suggested that no such inevitability ought to attach in law to business ruinations that result
from "combinations of capital. 1 36 Even though the combinations
initially might lower an article's price, "[flt is in the power of the
combination to raise it, and the result in any event is unfortunate
for the country by depriving it of the services of a large number of
small but independent dealers ....
Thus, Peckham's concern for the small businessman in
America, coupled with his conclusion that "combinations of capital" inevitably harmed the public interest, led him to construe the
antitrust laws in a way that would avoid the ruination of the class
of "small but independent dealers. 13 8 Peckham's romantic, antebellum notions 3 9 of what sparked "real prosperity" caused him to
134. Id. at 322-23.
135. Id. at 323.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 324.
138. According to Peckham,
Whether [such independent businessmen] be able to find other avenues to earn their
livelihood is not so material, because it is not for the real prosperity of any country
that such changes should occur which result in transferring an independent businessman, the head of his establishment, small though it might be, into a mere servant or
agent of a corporation for selling the commodities which he once manufactured or dealt
in, having no voice in shaping the business policy of the company and bound to obey
orders issued by others.
Id. at 324.
139. See supra note 138. For a discussion of Peckham's romantic wish to return to
simpler antebellum times and its influence on his jurisprudence, see Skolnik, Rufus
Peckham, in 3 THE JusTicEs OF THE UNrrED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1969, at 1685 (L.
Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969).
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utilize the Sherman Act as a vehicle for preserving a "big is bad,
small is beautiful," ideology of independent business. Remarkably,
Peckham failed to make the distinction that the instant case concerned railroads, which were characterized by their attendant public regulation and their demonstrated need for economies of scale.
He argued that at the time of the Sherman Act's passage,
[t]here were many and loud complaints from some portions of the public regarding the railroads and the prices they were charging... and it was alleged that the prices.., were unduly and improperly enhanced by combinations among the different roads ....
[T]he evil to be remedied is similar in
both [manufacturing and railroad] corporations, . . . we see no reason why
similar rules should not be promulgated in regard to both, and both be covered in the same statute by general language sufficiently broad to include
them both. 140

By reading the general language of the Sherman Antitrust Act
to cover railroads, Peckham undermined the new regulatory efforts
of the Interstate Commerce Commission14 1 and appeared to take a
firm stand in favor of a transcontinental transportation system
that was dominated by individually operated, small business enterprises. Of course, the Supreme Court eventually accepted the rule
of reason analysis that Peckham rejected and recognized the intent
of the Act's framers to implement only the rule of the common law
at the federal level. 142 Nevertheless, one who considers Peckham's

ideology as it related to the influence on the Act of the desire to
restrain arbitrary power-in the form of large business enterprises-is better equipped to explain current debates on that issue.
The idea of "per se" antitrust law rules, for example, owes much to
ideologies like Peckham's.1 4 3 Furthermore, the resistance to argu140. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 319-20, 324-25
(1897).
141. Peckham strongly suggested that the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
condoned the railroad's practices of entering into "rate agreements" to ensure the continuation of railroad service at reasonable rates and free from ruinous competition. Id. at 314-15,
321. Although the ICC apparently had been directed to enforce the law against "pooling
agreements"--agreements to parcel out freight and territories between competitors that
were forbidden by the Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (current
version at 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (Supp. 1I 1979)) - it did not interpret "pooling agreements"
to include rate agreements. J. GAmuTY, THE NEw COMMONWEALTH 1877-1890, at 112-19

(1968).
142. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910); see supra note 132
and accompanying text.
143. Several practices in restraint of trade have been regarded as so obviously odious
that no "rule of reason" is applied, and a violation of the antitrust laws is made out once
evidence of the particular practice is established. Some examples of these practices are price
fixing, collective boycotts, and market sharing. See A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE
U.S.A. 27-28 (2d students' ed. 1970).
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ments that these and other "inefficient" antitrust law rules should
be abandoned in the interest of wealth maximization144 perhaps is
attributable to the continued viability of Peckham's free enterprise
notions about the nature of real prosperity. This continued viability in turn supports the conservative school's contention that the
law progresses according to fixed intellectual principles that judges
145
apply to new situations.

Advocates of a market-oriented, wealth-maximizing system
appear to have the upper hand in the current federal administration. In a statement that directly contravened Peckham's perspective, Attorney General William French Smith recently announced
that the Justice Department's Antitrust Division was reexamining
"inefficient" prior official positions on antitrust law interpretation
pursuant to the insight that "bigness is not necessarily bad. ' 14 6

This new policy illustrates how perceived popular demand for economic progress-in this case, for an end to perceived unnecessary
restraints on productive capital and economies of scale-may result in the change or abandonment of statutory or common-law legal rules. The next section considers other opportunities for exploring this phenomenon by suggesting insights of the Wisconsin
school of legal historians, who concentrate on legal change resulting from the pressures of a societal consensus on the desirability of
economic progress.
B.

The Wisconsin School and the Alteration of Rules of Law
in Service of Economic Progress and Social Wealth
1. Groves v. John Wunder Co.

One can conjure up many historical examples to support the
Wisconsin school's contention that American law has changed to
accommodate the needs of industrial capitalists in a market economy. Perhaps the best starting point for this analysis, however, is
the traditional contracts case of Groves v. John Wunder Co.1 4 7 Defendant in Groves had agreed to leave plaintiff's property at a uniform grade after removing sand and gravel from the land. Since
the cost of levelling the land would be $60,000 and the resulting
144. For arguments regarding the supposed inefficiencies that are inherent in much of
current antitrust law, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw, 210-552 (2d ed. 1977) and

sources cited therein.
145. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
146. Wall St. J., June 25, 1981, at 6, col. 2.
147. 205 Minn. 163, 286 N.W. 235 (1939).
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value of the property would be only about $12,000, defendant deliberately breached the contract and refused to level the land. Defendant argued that damages to plaintiff should be the difference
in the value of the property before and after it was graded. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that damages should be calculated as the cost of performance.
The Groves majority held for plaintiff and awarded damages
based on the cost of levelling plaintiff's land. The court in essence
reasoned that land is unique, stating that "[t]he owner's right to
improve his property is not trammelled by its small value. ' 14 8 A
strong dissent, however, argued that damages should be calculated
based on the diminished value rule-as long as no evidence existed
to support the contention that plaintiff wanted the land levelled to
satisfy his personal tastes-and rejected the proposition that the
measure of damages should be increased because the breach was
1 49
willful.
To put the Groves majority's decision into context, one must
understand the special treatment that the English and American
common law has accorded land. Although the availability of specific performance in disputes over land illustrates this treatment
most clearly, the same considerations apparently influenced the
majority's decision to award Groves the cost of contract completion
rather than the decrease in the land's value caused by the breach.
The majority's thesis in effect was that one simply cannot put an
objective market value on land; the Groves dissent, on the other
hand, would reject this thesis when the purpose of a specific transaction is clearly and measurably economic. To gain more than a
mere intuitive grasp of the majority's uniqueness-of-land concept,
one must consider centuries of English and American colonial cultural and legal history, in which all life centered around land, and
people's status, social duties, and responsibilities arose from their
relationships to that land. 5 '
One fairly can speculate that the Groves majority missed the
essential economic purpose of the transaction in question because
it accepted the Jeffersonian vision that Americans should continue
to attach primacy to land. In his Notes on Virginia, Jefferson posited that Americans should make their livelihood on small plots of
148. Id. at 168, 286 N.W. at 237.
149. Id. at 171-85, 268 N.W. at 239-45; see Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co.,
382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1963).
150. See, e.g., F. GANSHoF, FEUDALISM (3d ed. 1964); P. LASLE'r, THE WORLD WE HAvE
LOST (1965); L. WRIGHT, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF THE AMERiCAN COLONIES 1607-1763 (1957).
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land by continuing as brave yeomen farmers who would shun commerce, industrial expansion, and luxury.' What Groves did with
his land and money is not what Jefferson suggested, of course, but
that is not the point-the point is that the law of contracts sometimes allows judges to ignore the economic valuation of the market
and to impose remedies based on the supposedly unique value of a
particular piece of land. The Groves case thus demonstrates the
law's accounting for personal idiosyncrasy, a characteristic that
also supports the position of those who stress the legal value of the
15 2
operation of private wishes in public regulation.
The relevance of the Groves case in this context is that it
presents the tension between a traditional rule-supporting individuality by recognizing the uniqueness of land when measuring
value-and a more modern approach-calculating damages based
solely on economic loss. According to the Wisconsin school's thesis,
both these rules arose because of the economic needs of society. As
these needs have changed over time, the holding in Groves has become almost an exception to a general rule; the Groves dissent appears more in keeping with the trend of American law to weigh
market considerations most heavily in reaching economic results
that diminish the importance of individual idiosyncrasy, reduce
uncertainty, and presumably minimize inefficiency while maximizing production. 53 Thus, by approaching the Groves case from the
Wisconsin school's perspective, one can better examine the role of
market forces in judicial decisionmaking.
2.

Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge

The first great constitutional law case that most fully embraces the core value of American law of maximizing economic progress at the expense of other property interests is the Supreme
Court's decision in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge.'"
151. The most famous section in which this point is made in the Notes is Jefferson's
response to query XIX. T. JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia (1781-82), in THE LnF
AND SELECTED WRMNGS oF THOMAS JEFFERSON 279-81 (A. Koch & W. Peden eds. 1944); see
Letters from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Van Ogendorp (Oct. 13, 1785), J. Bannister, Jr.
(Oct. 15, 1785), and A. Stuart (January 25, 1786), reprinted in TNE LInE AND SELECTED
WRMNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra at 384-85, 385-88, 390-91.
152. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text; J. DAWSON & W. B. HARVEY, CASES
AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 12-13 (3d ed. 1977) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §
346, illustration 4).
153. See, e.g., M. HoRWrrz, supra note 4, at 196-201 (the "objective" theory of contract helps ensure certainty and predictability in mature markets).
154. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 419 (1837). See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text. For
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Eighteen years before the Charles River Bridge case, the Court in
Dartmouth College v. Woodward 55 held that the grant of a corporate charter to Dartmouth College was a contract that the contract
clause of the Constitution' 56 protected from state interference in
the absence of a reserved power of amendment. The Charles River
Bridge case presented the question of how narrowly the state contractual obligations incurred in the granting of charters should be
construed. In 1785 the State of Massachusetts chartered the
Charles River Bridge Company to build a toll bridge across the
Charles River and granted the company a franchise to collect tolls
for an extended number of years. In 1828, when the Charles River
Bridge franchise still had a substantial time to run, the State
chartered a competing bridge company to operate a toll-free
bridge. The effect of the second charter, of course, was to render
the Charles River Bridge Company's franchise worthless. The
Charles River Bridge charter contained no language dealing with
the state's authority to grant competing charters; the new bridge
company, therefore, argued that the strictly construed language of
the document and the State's obligation to act in the public interest justified new bridge charters whenever the interests of commerce or public transportation made them necessary. The Charles
River Bridge Company, on the other hand, argued that since an
undertaking not to breach can be implied in every contract, the
original charter should be construed to contain an implicit assurance that the State would do nothing to render the charter worthless. Both the new and the old bridge proprietors based their arguments on the country's need for economic development: the
Charles River Bridge Company argued that this development
would be stymied if initial investments were not assured full contractual protection, and the Warren Bridge Company argued that
the same development would be frustrated if newer forms of transportation were not allowed easily and freely to compete with old
ones. 157 As Justice Taney explained in his majority opinion holding
for the Warren Bridge Company, the real issue in the case might
have been whether the newly burgeoning railroad industry would
be checked by lawsuits from the moribund turnpike companies,
an excellent Wisconsin school analysis of this case, see S. KuTLma,
DESTRUCTION:

155.
156.
obligation
157.

THE

CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CAsE

PRIMVEGE AND CREATIWE

(1971).

Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
law impairing the
pass any ...
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No state shal ...
.
of contracts ...
S. KUTLER, supra note 154, at 43-44.
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whose business the railroads were then seizing.
The Charles River Bridge case dramatically illustrates how
public pressures for economic progress can change either the applications of constitutional rules or the conceptions of property or
contract. Indeed, the depth of the chagrin that Justice Story and
Chancellor Kent felt after the rendering of the decision is indicative of the extreme nature of legal change during the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, Kent "thought Taney's opinion . . . was

miserable and [Story's] gigantic," and reportedly could read Taney's opinion only with "shuddering disgust" and "increased repugnance." 15 81 Story himself, who dissented in the case, wrote in
1837 that "I am sick at heart,.
and now go to the discharge of
my judicial duties ... with a firm belief that the future cannot be
'159
as the past.

Although Wisconsin school historians would attribute the legal
change signaled by the Charles River Bridge case to a difference
over the best method of achieving the concensus goal of economic
development, members of the radical transformation school 60 examining the same case would probably be more struck by the perceptions of extreme change on the part of Story and Kent revealed
both by the application to constitutional law of the "instrumental
conception" 161 of law and the malleability of legal doctrines, which
jurists such as Story and Kent themselves had poineered in the
private law area. This Article, therefore, next considers some radical transformation school concepts that can be used to develop understanding of American private law.
C. Conflict Between Core Values and Radical Transformation
in Private Law
One of the primary premises of the radical transformation
school is that the power centers of American society in the nineteenth century used the law as a vehicle for promoting fluid, entrepreneurial uses of capital at the expense of rentier interests. 1 62
The seminal work of this school, Horwitz' The Transformation of
158.

G.

DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT 365-66

(1970).
159.

Letter from Joseph Story to James Kent (June 26, 1837), quoted in 5 C. SWISHER,
1836-64, at 93

HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD

(1974).
160. See supra notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
161. Id.; see M. HoRwrrZ, supra note 4, at 1-30.
162. See supra notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
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American Law,1 " provides many examples in tort, property, and
contract law to support this proposition. Horwitz' book, for example, discusses Justice Story's intent in cases such as Van Ness v.
Pacard'" and argues that Story altered American property rules to
enable American tenants to invest in productive capital without
risking their landlords' appropriating their investments by applying the English "waste" doctrine.16 5 Horwitz' work also facilitates
a study of Chancellor Kent's efforts to mold American common law
in a manner consistent with his ideals of economic progress. 1 6" Furthermore, Horwitz' analysis is particularly useful when studying
how the nineteenth century case of Seymour v. Delancey'" altered
the rules regarding adequacy of consideration; Horwitz claims that
the court in Delancey effected this change because it deemed objective market principles to be more important than popular equitable considerations. 1 "
Another leading work of this school, Richard Danzig's brilliant
article' 6 9 on Hadley v. Baxendale7 0 provides a further radical
transformation study of the competition between popular equitable notions and particularized demands of industrial organizations.
Danzig thoroughly examined the facts of the case and offered the
thesis that the needs of an increasingly organized English national
market prompted the court to adopt the Hadley forseeability rule
as a means of minimizing the unpredictable exercise of jury discretion in the local courts. Extending Danzig's analysis, one might
also conclude that the quick acceptance of the forseeability principle in America followed from similar needs.
Studies like Horwitz' and Danzig's suggest that in the process
of transforming legal doctrines to accommodate emerging national
markets, older equitable concepts, and their democratic manifestations-for example, jury discretion in setting breach of contract
damage awards-impersonally were dismissed from the law. These
scholars' perspectives can provide valuable insights into the cur163. See supra notes 4 & 48-69 and accompanying text.
164. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137 (1829).
165. M. HoRWrrz, supra note 4, at 55-56. According to the English "waste" doctrine,
any fixtures removed by the tenant-unless they were "trade fixtures" used in some nonag-

ricultural trade would create tenant liability for the value of the fixtures removed. Id.
166. Id. at 117-18, 124-26, 138-39, 165, 190.
167. 6 Johns. Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. Ct. 1822), rev'd, 3 Cow. 445 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824).
168. M. HoRwirz, supra note 4, at 179-80.
169. Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrializationof the Law, 4 J.
LEoAL STuD. 249 (1975).
170. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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rent state of the law and how it progressed to this point. Nevertheless, as the discussion above of Peckham's opinion and the Groves
decision suggests, American legal history seems never really to
bury old equitable or social concepts completely. Our legal system,
therefore, is perhaps best described as a system for reconciling new
and old values, mores, and perspectives. The next section of this
Article thus examines the conflict between, and the occasional reconciliation of, these conflicting legal pressures.
D. Reconciling Diverse Demands: The Heroic Mode in Legal
History
The works of the radical transformation theorists provide a
fruitful source for examining the simultaneous existence of competing perspectives, since the methodological care of those theorists usually leads them to present enough data that one can derive
interpretations which are quite different from their own occasionally polemic conclusions.17 1 The pressures of competing ideological
imperatives, however, usually emerge with more clarity in the work
of the heroic school writers. As discussed above, 172 the heroic mode
of doing legal history takes as its foundation the premise that
changes in the law are the result of individual strivings and personalities. Consequently, the historiography of this school often focuses on the internal forces at work on a particular jurist's decisionmaking. These forces are perhaps best examined by reference
to literary parables that illuminate the character of the decisionmaker in question. What follows, therefore, are two examples
of how the legal careers of great lawyers or jurists might be examined allegorically to divine a humanistic understanding of legal
development.
1. Lemuel Shaw
Lemuel Shaw, who was the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, is perhaps best known for his labor
law work17 8 and, in particular, for his opinions in Farwell v. Boston
& Worcester Rail Road 74 and Commonwealth v. Hunt.17

This

body of Shaw's work provides an excellent example for applying
171. See Presser, supra note 51, at 716-24.
172. See supra notes 70-91 and accompanying text.
173. See L. LEVY, supra note 70.
174. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).
175. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
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the historiographic technique outlined above, which in essence results in a confluence of law, history, and literature. In Farwell
Shaw held that the English "fellow-servant" doctrine applied in
America and, therefore, that a railroad laborer could not recover
from his employer for an injury that the negligence of a fellow
worker caused. In Hunt, however, Shaw determined that labor unions did not constitute conspiracies, a conclusion that contravened
the English and American law which existed at the time.178 The
surface inconsistencies between the two opinions generated a fascinating historical debate, 1 7 which no one has resolved definitively.
In keeping with the "literary" emphasis of heroic school analysis,
one might wish to resolve this inconsistency by considering the
work of Herman Melville.
Melville dedicated his first book, Typee, to Shaw, who was his
father-in-law. Shaw, in turn, was in love with Melville's aunt and
always carried two love letters from her in his wallet. Since their
families appear to have been exceptionally intimate, 8 considering
Melville's Captain Vere in Billy Budd as a character based at least
in part on Shaw is certainly a fair assumption. In allegorical
terms, then, the character of Billy Budd could represent the American workingman-a simple laborer such as Farwell-and Vere's
judgment that Billy Budd must hang could represent Shaw's treatment of workers in the Farwellcase. In the novel, Vere incorrectly
asserts that Billy acted of his own free will when he killed Claggart, and in Farwell, Shaw asserts the social fiction that workers
are free to contract as they wish. Vere, like Shaw, professes to be a
just, if stern, man, but just as the readers of Billy Budd are not
persuaded initially by this attitude, so the contemporary reader of
Farwell is not persuaded that Shaw rendered "justice" to those
who suffered from the ravages of the "fellow-servant" rule.
On the other hand, one can probe deeper into the themes of
the novelist and the judge and reach a different conclusion. For
example, one might present Billy as negligent, even evil, and
thereby raise the possibility that Vere is in fact good and just. In
the novel, Billy Budd fails to report plans of a mutiny because his
176. For the contemporary English law, see Rex v. Journeymen Taylors, 8 Mod. Rep.
10 (K.B. 1721). For the American law, see People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1835).
177. Compare Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 32 COLuM. L. REv. 1128 (1932) with R.
PouND, supra note 38, at 86-88 (1938).
178. For the link between Shaw and Melville, see R. CovER, supra note 70, at 4-6
(1975).
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personal honor prevents him from informing on his peers. He then
proceeds to kill Claggart because of his frustration at Claggart's
false accusations. Billy's behavior threatens shipboard discipline,
and, since a state of war then existed, any breach in discipline
threatened the survival of the entire crew. Vere's treatment of
Billy, therefore, becomes necessary and inevitable. Similarly, the
labor unrest in New York City at the time of Farwell1 7 9 perhaps
suggested to Shaw the necessity for some demonstration to secure
discipline among workers.
In any event, both Vere and Shaw clearly transcended personal morality when they attempted to act according to a "higher
morality," a reaction which they believed the needs of the commonwealth required. Sailors engaged in a war cannot be permitted
to behave like savages, and workers must be treated as free agents
who contract for their own independence and are paid higher
wages for any higher risks that they assume. The interests of the
nineteenth-century economy in Farwell, like the interests of the
war effort in Billy Budd, are better protected under such a scheme;
private interests must be subordinated, at least in part, to the collective interest. Melville's ambiguous Billy Budd, however, offers
no simple answer to the question whether Vere's behavior was correct or praiseworthy. Shaw's treatment of laborers in Hunt, on the
other hand, does display a higher regard for the common good,
since he condones the organization of labor to preserve the contractual bargaining power of workers. Hunt thus is consistent with
the free market model that Shaw employed in Farwell, and this
model in turn becomes a higher morality with which to reconcile
the surface inconsistency between the Hunt and Farwellopinions.
The diverse themes in Melville's Billy Budd, therefore, help magnify the diverse themes in Shaw's jurisprudence. 180
2.

Benjamin Cardozo

One other example, which is drawn from comparing Justice
Cardozo to Greek literature, helps underscore the flexibility, diversity, and reach of the heroic school approach. Thus, perhaps the
best way to explain the multiple considerations at issue in Cardozo's opinion in Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua
179.

The unrest referred to in the text concerned a mass meeting of 27,000 people,

which was described as "the greatest meeting of working mea ever held in the United
States" until that time. L. LaVY, supra note 70, at 193.
180. See S. PRESER & J. ZAINALDIN, TEACHER'S MANUAL FOR LAw AND AMERICAN HisTORY: CASES AiN

MATERIALS

63-64 (1980).
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Bank8 1 is to approach the case after examining the problem in
Aeschylus' Oresteia. In Oresteia,Agamemnon, the Greek leader in
the battle against Troy, is brutally murdered by his wife, Clytemnestra, and her lover. Orestes, Agamemnon's son, then punishes his
mother for this foul deed by slaying her. In her last moments, Clytemnestra summons the Furies to hound and torment Orestes for
murdering her, The play, then, concerns the resolution of the conflict between an old morality-requiring one always to respect
blood ties-and a new morality, which suggests that, under certain
circumstances, matricide is justifiable. The play represents the
movement from the primitive, authoritarian, and aristocratic morality and social order to the more subtle and conditional democratic society and morality that was then emerging in fifth-century
Athens.'18
In Allegheny College Cardozo recognized the doctrine of
promissory estoppel and enforced a promise of a decedent to have
her executor grant a sum of money to a college. Judge Kellogg in
dissent, however, focused on the lack of contractual formalities in
the transaction and appeared to emphasize the need for bright-line
rules in contract law. Drawing upon the Oresteiaanalogy, one can
suggest that Kellogg's dissent represents an old morality and that
morality repCardozo's opinion casts him as a proponent of a new
8
3
estoppel.'
promissory
of
doctrine
the
resented by
This new morality, like that in the Golden Age of Athens, is
far more subtle than the old. Cardozo did not care what the parties
called their arrangement, or what they thought they were doing; he
was prepared to "weav[e] gossamer spider webs of consideration' '218 to advance the greater good of higher education over personal greed. Cardozo's new morality, therefore, subordinated the
wishes of the individual to the interests of the collectivity, which is
precisely what Oresteia and much of Greek tragedy took as its
181. 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927).
182. See Lattimore, Introduction to AEscHyLuS, ORESTIA 5-31 (R. Lattimore trans.
1953). See generally, AEscHYLus, EumENmES (H. Lloyd-Jones trans. 1970); E. DODDS, THE
ANcIENT CONCEPT OF PROGRESS AND OTHER ESSAYS ON GREEK LrrRATuRE AND BELEF (1973);
K. DovER, THE GmRKS (1981). Aeschylus was working through the use of several dichotomies, which now might simply be thought of as the distinction between the public and the
private interests-the fourth significant core value of American legal history discussed
above. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
I am indebted to my colleague in the department of classics at Northwestern, Brook
Manville, both for his suggestion of these sources and for his willingness to share his deep
understanding of Aeschylus with me.
183. See U.C.C. § 2-302; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) Or CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
184. G. GILMORE, supra note 77, at 62 (1974).
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foundation.185 Thus, comparing Cardozo's jurisprudence to the thematic strains in Greek literature can provide expanded insights
into the process of legal change that Cardozo so significantly
affected.
V.

CONCLUSION

That historians in law schools practice something called "legal" history seems to require some sort of explanation. "Legal" history seems to imply the existence of its opposite, and it is difficult
to imagine an "illegal" history without envisioning a group of
masked and surreptitious scholars bent on some nefarious purpose.
Perhaps this is why so many books that might have been entitled
"legal history" have been labelled histories "of," "and" or "in"
law.186 In another sense, however, the endeavor might be labelled
"legal history," rather than "the history of law." In teaching the
law's past, previous events illuminate the present and mark out
desirable choices for future conduct. In this sense, then, the teaching of history serves the same societal pattern-maintenance function as legal rules.
This pedagogical technique increases our understanding not
only of the nature of the American legal culture, but also, pursuant
to the particular possibilities that heroic school scholars have created, of the nature of mankind.28 7 These scholars teach us that a

great danger exists in preoccupation-at the individual or cultural
level-with a single value to the exclusion of others. As a result,
these scholars stress the need to remain simultaneously committed
to a variety of values. The implementation of this lesson requires
an openness of spirit and a maturity that is not always forthcoming in either societies or individuals; it also requires a willingness
to attempt the impossible and to run the risk of being labelled a
hypocrite.
In those eras of history when some Americans and their laws
were overly preoccupied with one of the four values described
185. As discussed above, see supra notes 173-80 and accompanying text, this theme
also concerned Shaw.
186. See, e.g., L. FRmMN, supra note 2; LAw INAwmsCAN HISTORY (B. Bailyn & D.
Fleming eds. 1971); S. PREssER & J. ZANALDIN, supra note 8.
187. The mythological insights that this school offers may be a sign that legal thinkers
have begun to explore the same territory as European structuralists such as Claude LviStrauss. See, e.g., C. LwVI-STRAUss, MYrHOLOGIQUts (1967-1971); C. LvI-STRAuss, 2 STRucTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1967); cf. Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 1980 Wis. L.
REv. 1383, 1400 (suggesting the need for American legal scholars to focus on the implications of the work of L.vi-Strauss, Habermas, Lacan, Barthes, and Althusser).
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above,188 tensions resulted that severely strained the fabric of
American society. In the early years of the Republic, rampant popular sovereignty resulted in arbitrary mob actions that made government all but impossible.""" In the mid-nineteenth century,
Southern orators' and lawyers' excessive emphasis on the private
sphere of protected property rights in slaves led to a gag rule in
Congress, to exaggerated fears of a Southern conspiracy among the
abolitionists, and ultimately to an orgy of Northern democratic
sentiment that resulted in the Civil War.1 90 In the years preceding
the New Deal, preoccupation with private property rights to contract led to a constitutional revolution that fundamentally reordered the nature of American government and led to an unhealthy
emphasis on restraining arbitrary private power through governmental intervention.'19 If the recent efforts of federal and state
courts represent a trend, 92 American society now is apparently attempting to regain some sense of balance and to retreat from the
188. See supra notes 11-33 and accompanying text.
189. Maier, Popular Uprisings and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-CenturyAmerica,
27 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 34-35 (3d Ser. 1970) (describing how post revolutionary Whig leaders
believed that continued mob activity after the American revolution, although arguably
based on notions of popular sovereignty, constituted "insults to government that were likely
to discredit American republicanism in the eyes of European observers").
190. For an excellent treatment of all these historical developments, see D. PoTTER,
THE IMPENDING CRISIS 1848-1861 (1976).

191. See, e.g., A. BicKEL, Tam SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).
192. Such a "trend" may be observed in a number of different substantive legal categories. In contracts, for example, certain signs suggest that state courts may be seeking to
reinforce private bargaining behavior rather than constantly reanalyzing the fairness of individual transactions. See, e.g., Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 277 A.2d 111
(D.C. 1971); Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 80, 351 N.Y.S.2d 911 (App.
Term 1974).
One theorist remarked in 1976 that it is inappropriate both to use judicial activism to
advance social objectives through private tort cases and to fashion negligence rules on a case
by case basis. Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of
Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 468 (1976). At least some recent negligence and products liability
decisions seem to share this concern that there must be some limits on the expansive construction of the doctrines. See In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (1968); Tibbetts v.
Ford Motor Co., 358 N.E.2d 460 (Mass. App. Ct. 1976). Finally, strong signs are appearing
that the United States Supreme Court wants to diminish the reach of the federal securities
laws. Federal authorities probably went far beyond the congressional intent when, in the
late 1960's and early 1970's, they used these laws to punish almost any conceivable fraudulent behavior in connection with the issuance of securities. See The Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Compare Superintendent of Ins. of
New York v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) and S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (apogee of liability for
fraud under securities laws) with Aaron v. S.E.C., 446 U.S. 680 (1980) and Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (apparently constricting the reach of the federal securities laws).
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rampant judicial activism of the past. The maintenance of this balance, however, never will be easy because no single core value ever
can be realized fully without endangering the others. Indeed, our
institutions always can be condemned for failing to honor the
promises that they were designed to fulfill.
Because we can never have true democracy, the efforts of our
legislatures often appear hypocritical. We can never have a totally
free market, or a maximum of economic progress and social mobility, without running the risk that monopolies will exercise intolerable arbitrary power. The most desirable course for society eventually may be to arrive at a communitarian existence, in which these
and other antinomies of the liberal perspective would be dissolved,
and society somehow would become free to discard the contradictory imperatives of the old individualistic values. The most brilliant recent attempt to lay the groundwork for such an existence,
however, apparently confesses frankly that reaching this utopian
state would be impossible without clearly articulated divine direc1
tion, which generally has not been available for two millenia. 93
Perhaps the best available alternative to such a goal is to consider why relative peace and prosperity have existed during much
of our legal past, and whether this tranquility has affected American law's commitment continually to reconcile the irreconcilable in
diverse values. As suggested earlier, then, because of the manner in
which selected parts of the history of law can suggest the proper
course to follow in the future, labelling this activity "legal history"
is perhaps correct. In teaching lawyers, at least, it seems appropriate to adopt this shamelessly presentist mode of history.'" "Legal
history," then, is really applied history, and it is probably theoretically distinguishable from "pure history"r-the search for the objective truth of the past-in the same sense that applied mathematics differs from pure mathematics. Nevertheless, since the
totality of past experience can never be recovered in full detail,
even the most scrupulous scholars must employ some principles of
selection, and each historian of the law, therefore, must make
methodological assumptions that are consistent with the values
which he or she holds.
At some point, then, all history of law may be "legal" history,
193. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLrrIcs 295 (1975).
194. In this sense, Hendrik Hartog's characterization of several legal historians appears accurate. Hartog, Distancing Oneself from the Eighteenth Century: A Commentary
on Changing Pictures of American Legal History, in LAW IN THE AMmCAN REVOLUTION,
supra note 6, at 230.
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even though some forms may be more "pure" than others. Indeed,
a complex dialectical interplay probably exists between the values
one expects to discover during the study of "pure" history of law
and the values one seeks to transmit when teaching. For now, however, law teachers should be concerned with "legal history" and
not, alas, the history of law. Some legal scholars, impatient with
Laskian or Bickelian pluralism,9 5 once again are searching for the
single key to achieving a perfectly functioning legal system.196
Some of them profess to find the solution in the "new conceptualism" of the Posnerian wealth maximization or efficiency analysis of
law and economics, 197 while others seek it in the "unholy trinity"
of Marxism, semiology, and phenomenology.19 8 Nevertheless, formulating the law along the lines of the first philosophy would generate the same arbitrary power problem encountered in the latenineteenth century, and subscribing to the second ultimately
would lead to a socialism that-if much of recent world history is a
guide-inevitably would result in the suppression of valuable private diversity and initiative. One could do much worse than to settle for an enlightened Burkianism'" that is content to revel in inconsistency, to eschew simple or complex, one-track modes of
analysis, and to accept Holmes' view that repose is not the destiny
of man.2 °0 Short of divine revelation, then, we are not likely to
find a means to unlock the ultimate mysteries of our destiny, but
legal history still can be used to understand how best to fumble for
the keys.

195.

Cf. S. PRESSER & J. ZANALDIN, supra note 8, at 734-65 (noting that unhappiness

with Harold Laski's and Alexander Bickel's ethical position that society ought to maximize
competition between different values simply by maintaining access to the political process
led both Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright and the Warren Court to seek to implement their
own vision of a jurisprudence of "goodness").
196. For evidence of this trend, see Tushnet, supra note 187; Legal Scholarship: Its
Nature and Purposes, 90 Yale L.J. 955-1296 (1981).
197. For these professions, see Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, supra

note 34.
198. Tushnet, supra note 187, at 1399.
199. "Enlightened Burkianism" denotes adherence to Edmund Burke's "chief articles"
of a "universal constitution for civilized peoples." R. KimK, THE CONSEVATI E MIND FROM
BuRKs To SANTAYANA 15 (1953). Kirk derived these articles from Burke's speeches and writings as "reverence for the divine origin of social disposition; reliance upon tradition ... for
public and private guidance; conviction that men are equal in the sight of God, but equal
only so; devotion to personal freedom and private property;, opposition to doctrinaire alteration." Id. Since Burke limned an implicit philosophy that culled superior from inferior principles of the past, limiting an interpretation of Burke to the notion that what has gone
before ought to be repeated would be incomplete. See Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of
Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037,
1039 (1980).
200. Holmes, supra note 11, at 466.

